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This paper examines the impact of reducing corruption 
and improving transparency to lower trade costs in the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation region. The authors 
find, based on a computable general equilibrium model, 
significant potential trade and welfare gains for Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation members, with increased 
transparency and lower levels of corruption. Results 
suggest that trade in the region would increase by 11 
percent and global welfare would expand by $406 billion 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
explore the link between transparency, competitiveness, and trade costs. This work is aligned with the “Transparency and 
Competitiveness” project supported through a Trust Fund established by the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID). It is alingned with work in the Multi-
Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development project on “Trade Costs and Facilitation” of the World Bank. Additional 
information is available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/trade_costs/. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
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mail.dendai.ac.jp.  
by raising transparency to the average in the region. Most 
of the increase in welfare would take place in member 
economies undertaking reform. Among the reformers, 
the gross domestic product of Vietnam, Thailand, Russia, 
and the Philippines would increase approximately 20 
percent. The benefits to Malaysia and China would also 
be substantial with increased transparency and lower 
levels of corruption. 
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This study examines the economic impact and welfare gains associated with policy 
reform to improve transparency in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
region. We estimate these gains with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
The effects of improved transparency on trade and welfare through trade policy reform 
are largely unexplored. Most recently, Helble, Shepherd and Wilson (2007) estimated 
the impact of the improvement of transparency in APEC on bilateral trade in a gravity 
model approach. The study found a significant potential for trade expansion with 
improvement in the transparency of trade policy measures in APEC with estimated an 
increase in the intra-regional trade among APEC members of 7.5 %. 
 
Our study builds on the analysis and approach by Helble, Shepherd and Wilson (2007) 
in several new ways. First, we estimate the effects of transparency improvements in 
APEC on various important economic variables, such as welfare and production in both 
macroeconomic and sector terms, in addition to trade. The gravity model, while on a 
solid econometric and theoretic foundation, is only capable of providing estimates of the 
impact of reform on nominal bilateral trade flows.  In  particular,  we are interested here 
in assessing the economic benefits associated with welfare in the APEC region to 
inform priority setting in APEC related to the goal of open trade in the region by 2010 
for developed member economies and 2020 for developing members. 
 
Second, our analysis provides a valuable way to revisit results on potential gains found 
with the gravity model estimates in earlier work. The general equilibrium framework, 
using the GTAP mode, in our study will explicitly demonstrate the transmission 
mechanism of policy reform steps -- in our case transparency improvement in the trade 
policy -- throughout the APEC member economies at the sector level. 
 
Third, we estimate the impact of transparency improvements on trade costs and welfare 
by distinguishing between the benefits of reducing waste and inefficiencies in trade 
procedures and policies from benefits of reform related to lessening the burden of 
corruption and other nontransparent payments -- such as bribes and irregular payments 
demanded of traders at the border. We find that there are different impacts on welfare 
  2associated with these two types of reforms, although their impacts on trade costs 
themselves are largely the same. 
 
Fourth, the GTAP model deployed in this analysis covers the entire world and is not 
limited to the APEC economies.  The model we use allows for observation of the 
impacts of bilateral trade flows between APEC member and non-member economies, 
placing a focus on the issue of trade diversion or creation under differing scenarios. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we survey the empirical literature on 
relationships between transparency and trade costs.  Section 3 discusses our 
methodological approach and model, and Section 4 provides results and implications 
from the analysis.   
 
2.  Trade  Facilitation,  Transparency  and  Trade  Costs 
 
Trade facilitation reform to lower transactions costs is one of the major policy goals in 
the Asia Pacific region and among APEC member economies. Traditionally in APEC, 
trade liberalization involves the reduction of traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs and 
import quotas.    Trade facilitation generally covers measures to reduce trade costs both 
at the border and internal to member economies. The Bogor Declaration of APEC 
leaders in 1994 include this dichotomy. With the reduction in traditional trade barriers 
over the past decade, however, attention has shifted to trade facilitation measures as a 
major step toward lower trade costs and more open trade in the region. 
 
Trade facilitation measures most often refer to administrative or procedural steps in the 
trading environment that affect costs.  This includes streamlining customs clearance 
procedures, harmonizing product standards and conformance certifications, or 
deregulating licensing requirements in the transport sector, for example. The 
improvement of transparency in trade policies, however, is also a factor to consider 
when addressing reform steps toward lowering trade transactions costs. 
 
Among previous estimates of the potential gains to reform in trade facilitation, a 
research report by APEC Economic Committee (APEC (1997)), drawing on the survey 
  3results by the Cecchini Report (1988), assumed that the overall trade facilitation 
measures committed in Individual Action Plans in 1996 of the APEC members would 
reduce the trade costs by 1 - 2 percent. The leaders of APEC in 2001 committed to 
implementing the APEC Trade Facilitation Principles (Shanghai Accord) with a view to 
reducing trade transaction cost by 5 percent of transaction costs by 2006.   
 
More recently, Francois et. al. (2003) used a policy scenario of reduction in trading 
costs related to trade facilitation measures expected with success in the Doha round of 
trade talks at the World Trade Organization. The cost reduction effect of trade 
facilitation, based on the range of available estimates, was assumed to range between 
1.5 percent (partial liberalization) and 3 percent (full liberalization) of the value of 
world trade. Most other studies completed to date use the estimated cuts in trade costs 
by trade facilitation as the initial shock to general equilibrium models. These studies 
share a common conclusion that trade facilitation measures would bring about 
significant improvement in global welfare. 
 
Compared to empirically estimated trade costs, the assumed magnitude of trade cost 
reduction from the trade facilitation reform of about 3 to 5 percent of import prices 
appears modest and feasible. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) suggest 
that trade costs add up to 74 percent in terms of an ad valorem tax equivalents, 
including all transport and border-related costs from foreign producers to the border of 
the importing country
3. This also implies that there exists further potential to reduce 
global trade costs. Improved transparency is likely one of the more important of such 
policies with the potential to lower trade costs, especially in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Trade Facilitation and Transparency Improvements in Trade Policy 
 
Our interest here rests with the identification and quantification of the initial shocks 
from improvement in the transparency of trade policies on import prices or other 
changes in exogenous variables, if any.  Helble, Shepherd and Wilson (2007, HSW, 
hereafter) undertook the first evaluation of the effects of improving the transparency of 
                                                 
3  According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the additional local distribution costs to the 
final consumer of the importing country is 55 %. As such, the total trade costs reach 170 %. 
  4trade policy on trade in APEC.  The authors constructed indices of transparency 
including an exporter transparency index (ETI) and importer transparency index (ITI) 
through principal factor analysis. 
 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique to produce an index summarizing performance 
across a number of correlated indicators.  HSW derived an index by assuming that an 
unobserved factor (‘transparency’) is responsible for the common variation in the 
original set of indicators. Statistical techniques can be used to identify that unobserved 
factor in terms of a weighted average of the original indicators. 
 
This methodology reflects the approach taken by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) in 
producing a composite security index, and is close to the principal components 
methodology used by Francois and Manchin (2007) to produce summary indices of 
country performance in the areas of infrastructure and institutions. We prefer the first 
principal factor to the first principal component because the former allows for variation 
within the indicator set to be due to both common and individual causes, while the latter 
assumes that all variation is common   
 
Specifically, the ITI index in HSW is the first principal factor, combining 11 variables 
linearly; i.e. 3 variables on predictability of customs administration (time spread for 
import, standard deviation of irregular payments, and favoritism), 4 variables of 
predictability and the simplification of trade policy (percentages of bound tariff lines, 
tariff dispersion, hidden barriers, and E-readiness), and 4 variables on simplification of 
customs administration (clearance time of imports, numbers of agencies involved in 
import, numbers of documents required for import, and irregular payments)
4. Then the 
transparency indices enter as regressors in a gravity model to explain changes in 
bilateral trade in the Asia Pacific. Appendix A introduces the estimate of ITI in HSW, 
and revisits the implication of the index on trade cost. As indicated in the next 
subsection, the exporter transparency index is found insignificant in the gravity 
regression, and therefore, the Appendix omits the explanation on it. 
 
                                                 
4  The calculated indexes are normalized across the economies in APEC region to be between 
zero to one. 
  5The specification of the gravity model aligns with a microeconomic general equilibrium 
foundation postulated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), which derived a 
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economy, and the group of traded commodities, respectively
. The equation contains unobservable explanatory variables, namely, 
pecific trade barriers, tij, and inward and outward trade resis
T
trade cost function as  tij = bijdij
ρ, where bij is the coefficient to be estimated and dij is the 
bilateral distance.    To manage the multilateral resistance terms, the authors derived the 
reduced and implicit form of the equation with all the exogenous variables (distance, 
intra-trade dummy and the production share of the economy in the world) in the 
right-hand side, and use a non-linear least square method. They indicated an alternative 
approach to assume a fixed-effect structure for the country-specific multilateral 
  6resistance terms, and  the linear equation with replacing the multilateral 
resistance terms with country-specific dummy variables. 
 
Helble, Shepherd and Wilson (2007) adopt a fixed effects approach, and specified 
bilateral trade 
k
ij t  not with the distance but with other observable variables related to 
trade barriers, including the transparency indexes. With some modification
5, the 
specification of the trade cost function appears as follows: 
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The first term of ht hand side is a trading-pair dummy variable, representing the 
such as transport costs, historical factors, and geographical particularities between the 
trade pair. The importer’s applied tariff is denoted τij
k. The term  gauges the 
resence of non-tariff barriers in the importing economy. More importantly, the two 







Replacing (2) into (1), and adding  γk, as representing commodity-specific fixed-effect, 
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6, we obtain the specification of the gravity 
model (3): 
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 where  X: the amount of export from i to j 
(τis ad valorem import tariff rate in j) 
  ntb: the index of non-tariff barrier in j 
                                                
  Y: Gross Domestic Product in i or j 
  1 +  τ: the power to import price because of import tariff   
 
5  The original specification of HSW includes the trading-pair-specific fixed effect term in the 
trade regression, not in the trade cost function here, but the inclusion of the term may better 
explain the structure of trade cost. 
6  This omission reflected the purpose and priority of the study to investigate the bilateral 
effects.   
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Tariff-equivalent Estimates of Improving the Transparency of Trade Policy 
 
Helble, Sheperd, and Wilson (2007) regressed the equation (3) with an econometric 
technique. The estimated coefficients of effective tariff and import transparency index 
(ITI) are 1.421 and -1.864, respectively in the baseline case. The exporter transparency 
index (ETI) is found insignificant in the regression in HSW, therefore, we do not use the 
index to estimate welfare effects in this paper. The 
im
trade. (Using the estimates of HSW, one may obtain the tariff-equivalent meas
im
 
We may recall the equation  pij = tijpi where pij is the price of imports from i for the 
consumer in j, and pi is exporter’s supply price, net of trade costs. This leads to 
dlog(pij) = dlog(tij) if  pi is fixed, where d log(.) denote percentage change. In equation 
(3), both nominal tariff reduction and improvement of importers’ transparency 
contribute to the reduction of the trade cost factor tij and decline in pij. In turn, from (1), 
the decrease in the bilateral trade cost factor tij will increase the bilateral trade, unless 
the multilateral trade resistance significantly offset the impacts. If the transparency 
  8index changes by 1 percent, then the trade cost factor changes by  3 β percent and 
change trade byβ3(1−σk)  from equation (3)
7. The same percentage change in the trade 
cost factor is brought about by  β3
β1
percent change in the tariff factor  (1+τij
the estimate by Helbel, Shepherd and Wilson (2007), the ratio is about - 1.312 (= -1.864 
/1.421)
)





The rather lar timated coefficient of the ITI sho
he ITI may reflect not only transparency in ense, 
ut also institu ciency, or even modernization of trade pr  in an 
As a result, our reference conversion factor  
                                                
8. This gives us the tariff-equivalent (more accurately, tariff-power-equivalent) 
measures for the transparency index changes. One may consider this ratio to convert 
from the percentage change in ITI to that in tariff power to bring about the same amount 
of changes in trading costs. 
 
characteristics of this index as a proxy of institutional capacity and efficiency in trade 
policy. The ITI is essentially a principal factor, which is mechanically calculated from 
the eleven variables (see Appendix A). While these variables should commonly indicate 
the degree of transparency in trade policy, the variables may contain wider information, 
not limited to transparency. T






economy. An economy with a higher ITI score is likely to have better governance and 
institutions in trade. In this sense, the index in the gravity regression should be regarded 
as proxy variable, representing institutional efficiency, openness and fairness in trade – 
i.e. transparency.   
 
The comparison among the results from the various sector base regressions confirms the 
plausibility of the magnitude of the conversion factor. HSW undertake the same 
regression on the sector/commodity breakdowns. The estimated conversion factors and 
the cases are: -2.61 for all the commodities, -1.22 for only the non-basic manufacture 
(HS > 83), -2.27 for homogeneous goods (goods traded on an organized exchange, or 
reference priced go
 
7  This applies only when the change in the bilateral trade cost factor does not significantly 
change the multilateral trade resistance terms. 
8  These figures are the baseline estimate, covering all the commodities except for raw materials 
(HS 1-27). The coefficient of the tariff variable is significant only at a 15% level in the specific 
regression. However, the estimated value is around the mid-point among the various 
specifications. 
  9rather modest side. Moreover, the empirical findings of Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 
rvice sector infrastructure (0.73). Because these variables are 
ormalized between one and zero, we add them up to obtain the elasticity of 
                                                
(2005), which is the pioneering, article to assess the trade facilitation policies, are 
comparable. Their reference regression of bilateral trade has, as regressors, bilateral 
tariff rates, distances, mass variables (such as GDPs), together with various trade 
facilitation indicators.   
 
The trade facilitation indicators include (1) port efficiency of exporters and importers, 
(2) custom environment of importers, (3) regulatory environment of exporters and 
importers, and (4) service sector infrastructure of exporters and importers.  Among 
these, the indicators closely related to importers transparency (and their estimated 
elasticity) are customs environment of importers (0.47), regulatory environment of 
importer (0.28), and se
n
simultaneous progress of the transparency related trade facilitation, estimated to be 
about 1.48. The estimated coefficient of bilateral tariff rates is -1.16. The 





9  Again, it should be reminded that ITI is a proxy of institutional capacity and efficiency. 
  103.    A Framework and Methodology for the Model Estimates 
 
Based on the econometric estimates in the former section, our study adopts a 
computable general equilibrium model and database from GTAP (Global Trade Analysis 
Project)
10 to estimate the effects on welfare and other variables, under the baseline 
scenario, namely to improve ITI in the APEC region such that no economy is below the 
current regional average. The model simulation provides a rough idea of the magnitude 
of welfare gains and other effects, together with the theoretical mechanism of the 
creation of such effects. The aggregation of the region and industrial sectors 
(commodity) is 21 regions of the world times 4 sectors (see Appendix B for the list of 
aggregation). All the member economies in APEC except for Papua New Guinea and 
Brunei have their own entry in the aggregation. The four sectors in the industrial 
aggregation correspond to the classification used in the empirical analysis by Helble, 
Shepherd and Wilson (2007). The database with its base year at 2004 is updated to 
reflect the changes in the relative scale of the economies to the year 2006, by 
extrapolating the growth of labor force, capital stock and technical progress. In addition, 
the abolishment of the multi-fiber agreement is applied to the database, as a major 
revision. Our simulation adopts the basic model option that assumes constant returns to 
scale with perfect competition. The simulation with the basic option identifies only the 
long-run economic effects through efficiency improvement, providing results that are 
easier to trace. The section below outlines the methodological issues regarding the 
selection of the shock variables, and quantification of such policy shocks. 
 
Model Specification for Reducing Trade Costs: The Iceberg Approach 
 
The model simulation chosen requires identifying and quantifying the initial shocks in 
our exogenous variables. In the case of trade facilitation as an initial shock to a CGE 
model, modelers have used a so-called iceberg specification
11 as a standard approach. 
The latest GTAP model, version 6.2, provides a ready-made variable (ams) to enable 
                                                 
10  The GTAP released the latest version (version 7, pre-release 6) of the database in 2008. The 
base year of the database is the year 2004. 
11  This illustrates the situation that a fraction of goods shipped is lost (melt) in transport, which 
is a pure loss in the process of trade.  
  11specific simulation for the policies to progress the technology of trade, and reduce the 
trade costs under the assumption of horizontal long-run supply curve. . The related 
equations for bilateral trade of specific goods in the GTAP model follow below, with 
lower case variables denoting percentage change. The arguments in the parentheses 
represent as follows: i; commodity, r: exporting region, and s: importing region. 
 
pfob(i,r,s) = pm(i,r,s) – txs(i,r,s)      ( a )  
Export Taxation: This describes that the percentage change in export price in 
the world (FOB price, pfob) from region r to region s fully reflects the 
percentage change in domestic market price in exporting region r (pm), net of 
negative export tax, (txs). 
pcif(i,r,s) = FOBSHR(i,r,s) * pfob(i,r,s) + TRNSHR(i,r,s) * ptrans(i,r,s)   (b) 
International Transportation: Reflecting the international transportation costs, 
this describes that the percentage change in CIF price (pcif) fully reflects the 
weighted average of the percentage change in FOB price (pfob) and the 
percentage change in international transportation price (ptrans). 
pms(i,r,s) = tms(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s)      ( c )  
Import Taxation: This describes that the percentage change in domestic price 
of imported goods i (pms) fully reflects the percentage change in CIF price 
(pcif) plus that in bilateral import tariff factor (tms). 
[] ∑ − =
k
s k i ams s k i pms s k i MSHRS s i pim )} , , ( ) , , ( { * ) , , ( ) , (     (d) 
Composite Import Price of Specific Goods in Importer: This describes that the 
percentage change in composite price of imported goods i (pim) fully reflects 
the weighted average of the percentage changes in import prices from each 
exporting region (pms) minus the cost-reducing technical progress (ams). The 
weights (MSHRS) are the shares of the exporting countries in the imports. The 
change in the composite price of imports brings about the substitution process 
between imported and domestic goods for the domestic users. In the GTAP 
model, the variable ams, import-augmenting technical change, is normally 
used as the exogenous shock variable for the simulation of the importing cost 
reduction, particularly that from trade facilitation measures. If one percent 
increase in ams takes place for all exporters, the price of the imported goods 
  12in the region in s declines by one percent. In the case that only the price of a 
specific imported goods from region s decline, the relative price of the import 
price of the goods from that specific region declines more, compared to the 
composite (weighted averaged) price of that imported goods from all over the 
world. 
)] , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( [ * ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( s i pim s r i ams s r i pms i ESUBM s i qim s r i ams s r i qxs − − − = +  
       ………. (e) 
Substitution Effects– Armington Structure: The demand side will react by 
substituting toward cheaper imports. The rate of change in the quantity of the 
bilateral export from r to s (qxs) and the amount of reduced waste (ams) in the 
trading process will be equal to the rate of change in total import of the goods 
in the region plus the substitution effect. Based on Armington (1969), the rate 
of change in the share of imports from a region is proportional to that in 
relative import prices with the elasticity, ESUBM. The same structure applies 
to the substitution between imports and domestically produced goods. 
 
An issue to consider is that the variable ams locates at the last stage of the price 
pass-through process. Empirical findings suggest that exporters, not importers, bear 
much of the costs of trade.  In contrast, the shock to ams causes the change in the 
prices of imported goods and not those of exported goods. In fact, this issue does not 
preclude the use of ams as an initial shock. The GTAP model assumes in principle a 
long-run price adjustment mechanism whereby producers can fully pass on the costs to 
final consumers
12. The exogenous variable ams represents technical progress, which 
leads to the reduction of supply prices. With the export price fixed, this translates into a 
reduction in trade costs. In this model structure, one may implement a shock of 
cost-reducing technical progress on any variable at any stage in the price pass-through 
process
13. Many of the trade facilitation reform measures considered here simply 
                                                 
12  The models with long-run nature normally assume the horizontal long-run supply curve, 
where any change in supply costs is passed on to the consumers.  The theoretical model in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) also assume the full pass-through process of the prices. Also 
in reality, while observed FOB prices do not include transportation costs, they tend to include 
other costs that are borne by the exporters. 
13  However, tax variables, such as import and export tariffs (tms and txs) should not be used as 
shock variables for most of the trade facilitation, because the model will react to the change of 
  13eliminate the pure waste (dead-weight loss) which occurs in the importing process. In 
essence, therefore, the cost recovery from such facilitation measures represents a form 
of technological progress, represented by ams. 
 
Reducing Trade Costs by Reducing the Scope for Corruption and Other 
Nontransparent Payments 
 
The standard treatment introduced above applies to most of the trade facilitation 
measures we are interested in here.  Some components of the transparency 
improvement require, however, further elaboration. In particular, as evidenced by the 
fact that the transparency indexes include the degree of irregular payments – as a proxy 
for corruption and other nontransparent payments – in each member economy, some 
form of tax-like transfer payments or bribes are sometimes demanded of exporters and 
importers.  Reducing payments under such rent-seeking activities in the importing 
countries will serve to lower trade costs in the same way as other trade facilitation 
improvements. However, it cannot be simply treated as technical progress in measuring 
welfare impacts because this brings about a transfer of income to someone in the 
importing countries. The removal of the transfer will cause the reduction of transfer 
income, as well as trade costs. Accordingly, the welfare impact from the reduction of 
such transfers is expected to be smaller than that from technical progress, if the rates of 
the reduction in trade cost are the same. 
 
Such components of transparency improvement mean the reduction of transfer or virtual 
taxes levied on imports.    The proper methodology here is to treat such payments as an 
import tax, and apply shocks to the rates of import tariff. Because government 
consumption does not depend on the level of tax collections in the GTAP model, this 
treatment does not bias expenditure. This has the merit of keeping the general model 
structure intact. 
 
The import tariff rates in the existing GTAP database reflect the levels of nominal 
effective tariffs in 2004. These tariff rates in the original database are required to be 
                                                                                                                                               
the tax revenue. Here, an assumption of the cost from the lack of transparency is a pure 
dead-weight loss becomes meaningful. 
  14adjusted to incorporate the irregular transfer payments, in addition to the nominal tariff 
rates, as long as information on the levels of trade costs from such payments are 
available. Malcolm (1998) suggests a procedure for incorporating improved information 
on taxes into existing model database while maintaining the internal consistency of the 
database and minimizing the impacts of the tax changes on the value flows in the 
database. This procedure can apply to our simulation with some minor modifications. 
We discuss the estimates of the amounts of trade costs from the transfer payments later 
in this section. 
 
Reducing Risks with Increased Transparency 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, improvement in the transparency of trade policy 
in an importing country should lead to reduced trade costs.  In a standard simulation, 
except for irregular payments demanded by national authorities made to move goods 
across borders, this can be treated as technical progress in the trading process. However, 
in the case of transparency improvements, risk in the trading environment complicates 
our analysis. Some types of transparency reform, such as regulatory simplification, may 
lower direct costs for traders. Other forms of transparency improvements, including 
greater predictability in the trading system, may bring about reduction only in potential 
risks for exporters. 
 
Moreover, cost reductions may be hypothetical, particularly for exporters who pay 
nothing for risk. In the real economy with real risks, however, most economic agents 
pay premiums to address risk.  This is true, for example, with the purchase of 
insurance, information gathering on risks in the system, and other measures undertaken 
by traders. A few risk-loving exporters may simply pay once risk arises. In the long run, 
all the exporters including the risk-lovers must pay the average costs of risk through 
higher trading costs. Implementing a shock to the variable ams also works well to 
reduce such risks in the long run. 
 
  15Quantification of the Shocks 
 
Quantification of the initial shocks in our analysis is another issue for consideration. 
The importer transparency indices are simply the principal factors. They do not carry 
any information on measurement units. The former section discussed the 
tariff-equivalent measures for transparency improvement. The estimated conversion 
ratio is about - 1.312 between the percentage change in ITI and that in tariff factor. 
Multiplying the assumed percentage change of ITI by this conversion ratio makes the 
percentage change in tariff factor (1 +τ) have an equivalent effect on trade costs. 
 
The rates of change in trade costs from improved transparency reflect two parts: (i) the 
technical progress or removal of pure loss, and (ii) the removal of irregular transfer 
payments with reduced scope for corruption and other hidden charges. The simplest 
way to estimate the second part, while keeping the consistency of the estimate, is to 
make use of their principle component scores and prorate them. Out of 11 variables 
constituting the transparency index, two items, i.e. irregular payments and their standard 
deviations
14, refer to irregular transfer payments. The principal factor scores of those 
two variables are 0.1585 and 0.1826, respectively. If ITI1 and ITI2 are defined as the 
import transparency indices referring to pure waste in the trading process and a tax-like 
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where αi is the principal factor scores of the variable mi.  The variables, m10 and m11 
are the measures of irregular payments and their standard deviations. 
 
The policy shock in our baseline simulation assumes improving importer transparency 
in the APEC region such that no economy is below the current regional average
15 with 
the scores of both reductions of waste and irregular payments being the same or above 
average. We define the contributions of the changes in ITI1 and ITI2 to the changes in 
                                                 
14  As a background assumption, a higher standard deviation in irregular payments forces 
importers to pay more irregular payments to avoid obstacles to crossing the border.    
15  The average figure is slightly different from that used by Helble, Shepaerd and Wilson 
(2007) (around 0.54), because of rounding error and only ITI2 being lower than regional 
average in Korea. 
  16ITI under the baseline scenario, as CntITI1 and CntITI2. As the regional average of ITI, 
ITI1 and ITI2 are 0.557, 0.419 and 0.138, their contributions are calculated as: 
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Under our baseline scenario, the contributions are all positive, or zero. Multiplying 
CntITI1 and CntITI2 with the conversion factor (- 1.312), we obtain the tariff-factor 
equivalent shocks from transparency improvement in reduction of waste and irregular 
payments, respectively.  The baseline scenario applies a considerably large initial 
impact to each economy. The average ITI scores of APEC members are 0.419 for ITI1 
and 0.138 for ITI2.     
 
Table 1 summarizes the model shocks under our scenario to simulate the improvement 
of transparency in trade policy. 
 
  17Table 1: Model Shocks in Baseline Scenario 





AUS 0.863 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BRU NA NA NA NA NA
CAN 0.756 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHL 0.743 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHN 0.332 15.6 -20.5 -13.1 -7.4
HKG 0.849 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IDN 0.388 11.5 -15.0 -12.3 -2.8
JPN 0.762 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
KOR 0.536 6.2 -8.1 0.0 -8.1
MEX 0.406 10.2 -13.4 -8.3 -5.1
MYS 0.445 7.4 -9.8 -7.5 -2.2
NZL 0.961 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PER 0.319 16.5 -21.7 -17.4 -4.3
PHL 0.226 23.9 -31.3 -16.9 -14.4
PNG NA NA NA NA NA
RUS 0.000 44.3 -58.1 -43.7 -14.4
SGP 1.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
THA 0.286 19.1 -25.1 -14.4 -10.7
CTP 0.809 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
USA 0.794 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VNM 0.103 34.4 -45.2 -34.4 -10.8








(Note) The second column shows the target percentage change in ITI to achieve the baseline scenario. 
The third to fifth columns indicate the target percentage change in terms of tariff power (1 + t). See 
Appendix B for the abbreviations of the member economies. 
 
As a policy shock under the baseline scenario, the importer transparency index (ITI) 
increases for China, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. The tariff-equivalent shocks in this scenario produce large cost 
reductions. In particular, the import cost reduction estimated for Russia and Vietnam is 
above 40 percent and for the Philippines is about 30 percent. These impacts appear large 
compared, for example, to APEC Trade Facilitation Principle (Shanghai Accord). APEC 
members adopted the goal of cutting trade transaction costs by only five percent under 
the Accord.    For example, our estimated cost reductions with improved transparency in 
Thailand, i.e. 25.1 percent equals to 25 times as large as the Shanghai Accord, if the 
  18trade transaction cost is set at Ad Valorem 25 percent. This comparison demonstrates the 
significance of improved transparency as a major institutional reform in trade policy. 
 
About 60 to 80 percent of the total trade cost reduction from transparency 
improvements in trade policy comes from the technical progress component, while the 
remaining 20 to 40 percent is attributed to the component related to irregular payments 
and transfer. The proportion of the impacts from irregular payments in trade costs is 
higher in some economies, such as Philippines, Mexico, Thailand and China. In Korea, 
only irregular payments appear to have a room for improvement in our scenario. 
 
Implementing Shocks to the Model 
 
The shock variable for the transparency improvement measures to bring about technical 
progress, ams, has bilateral arguments, and shocks can be implemented to any bilateral 
combinations. This is also the case for the shock variables for the reduction of irregular 
payments, which is emulated as import taxes tms. Our simulation applies these shocks 
to all trading partner and is not limited to APEC members. This is similar to trade 
liberalization under the principle of most favored nation treatment. A salient technical 
feature of trade facilitation measures includes this non-discriminatory outcome, because 
it is technically not feasible to apply the trade facilitation reforms only to a limited 
number of trade partners in a discriminatory manner. The improvement of transparency 
in trade policy apparently shares this virtue.   
 
Helble, Sheperd and Wilson (2007) use trade data in their gravity model with the 
following types of aggregation: (i) all the HS Chapters, (ii) excluding raw materials (HS 
1-27)
16, and (iii) excluding in addition basic manufactures (HS 1-83). The first type 
includes agricultural products and receives a strong bias from the existing higher tariffs.   
The third type suffers from fewer samples, resulting in their preferred set of results 
based on the second type. Our simulation includes two cases for applying shocks to the 
industrial sectors. The first case is to apply the same rate of shock to all the trading 
sectors, assuming that improvement in the transparency of trade policy accords benefits 
                                                 
16  The estimated value of tariff-factor-equivalent conversion (-1.312) draws from the regression 
in the second type.   
  19throughout the sectors. The second case is to exclude the raw materials sectors from the 
shock assuming that this sector cannot benefit at all from the transparency reform 
considered here. 
 
As indicated above, the original database needs to be adjusted to accommodate the 
changes in irregular transfer payments.    We treat them as higher nominal import tariffs. 
We need, therefore, to update the database to incorporate the increase in the nominal 
tariff rates by the amounts of additional trade costs from irregular payments. The GTAP 
model provides a convenient set of parameters and closure, named ALTERTAX, to 
adjust the tax rates while minimizing the changes in the trade and consumption flows of 
the original database. Appendix B discusses the technical issues in detail. Once the 
database is adjusted, the shocks for simulation can be implemented to ams for technical 
progress and tms for reduction in irregular payments in the model. 
 
4.    Simulation Results and Implications 
 




Theoretically, cost reductions in all sectors, whether by import augmenting technical 
progress or reductions in irregular payments and bribes, should stimulate the 
substitution of demand in favor of imports against domestic goods.    This should result 
in an increase in imports. Table 2 summarizes the simulation results on bilateral trade 
flows. Case 1 in the table assumes that import cost cuts from the improvement of 
transparency extend to all the sectors, and Case 2, to all sectors except for raw materials. 
Moreover, the trade data in Case 1 covers all the sectors, but Case 2 only covers the 
trade data in the sectors excluding raw materials. In Table 2, “APEC” indicates that the 
simulated impacts are calculated with only using the trade data among the APEC 
members, while “World”, with all the trade data in the world. One may note that the 
simulation in Heble, Sheperd and Wilson (2007) refers to intra-APEC trade only, 
corresponding to Case 2-APEC in Table 2. 
 




APEC World APEC World APEC
1 AUS 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 0.0
2 CAN -2.2 -2.4 -2.1 -2.1 0.0
3 CHL 3.1 0.0 1.6 0.4 0.0
4 CHN 30.4 30.2 27.1 26.7 29.0
5 HKG 3.1 2.0 1.0 0.3 0.0
6 IDN 15.6 16.9 11.9 12.3 20.3
7 JPN 3.2 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.0
8 KOR 20.9 17.8 20.1 18.2 0.4
9 MEX 20.2 19.7 19.0 17.7 17.7
10 MYS 10.3 11.0 8.4 9.0 12.1
11 NZL -0.7 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 0.0
12 PER 31.2 30.5 24.4 22.3 31.0
13 PHL 60.0 62.9 55.1 57.1 47.6
14 RUS 70.6 69.3 37.8 39.2 100.7
15 SGP 2.0 1.6 2.0 2.1 0.0
16 THA 132.7 117.6 128.2 124.3 36.7
17 CTP 2.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 n.a.
18 USA 1.3 -0.9 0.2 -1.1 0.0
19 VNM 37.0 44.1 27.3 31.2 73.6
20 EU27 n.a. -1.6 n.a. -1.5 n.a.
21 ROW n.a. -0.8 n.a. -1.0 n.a.
APEC Total 12.9 11.7 11.0 10.0 n.a.
World 11.7 4.5 7.2 3.6 n.a.




(Note) Authors’ calculation using the GTAP model, GTAP database version 7 pre-release 6, and 
Gempack. Row denotes importers, and Columns denotes exporters. 
 
In general, the reforming economies in APEC tend to increase imports. The impact is 
larger in the economies that undertake more significant reforms, in particular Russia, 
Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. In contrast, APEC member economies that have 
achieved a higher level of transparency experience minimal increases in imports
17. The 
results based on our CGE model simulation here are generally comparable with those by 
HSW. This is to be expected because both studies use the same estimates for reductions 
in trade costs. The relatively minor differences in results likely arise from the difference 
between assumed elasticities of substitution of imports in the GTAP model, i.e. 
                                                 
17 The large increase in the imports of Korea reflects the assumed reduction of irregular 
payment.   
  21Armington elasticities, and estimated coefficients in the gravity model.  Case 1, 
covering more heavily protected sectors of raw materials, indicates larger impacts in 
terms of percentage than Case 2. This result reflects the assumption in the model that 
raw material sectors are more sensitive to cost reductions in imports with the average 




Exports should increase significantly for economies that export to the reforming 
members in our analysis. In addition, the reformers themselves should expand exports 
in the long run, along with imports. Trade theory suggests that import barriers act as a 
tax on exporters, penalizing their exports. Table 3 illustrates the impact of reform on 
nominal exports. The notation on the cases (Case 1 and 2) and sample coverage 
(“APEC” and “World”) follow the same as described for Table 2. 
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Table 3: Estimated Impact on Nominal Exports (% change of baseline) 
HSW 2004
Importers
APEC World APEC World APEC
1 AUS 7.9 3.3 10.9 4.9 11.4
2 CAN -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 1.2
3 CHL 6.7 0.5 8.8 2.1 10.7
4 CHN 26.7 23.4 22.6 19.5 3.8
5 HKG 8.8 1.2 3.6 0.2 16.9
6 IDN 17.3 12.8 15.1 9.7 7.7
7 JPN 11.4 6.4 10.8 5.8 10.9
8 KOR 18.4 12.0 16.8 10.7 14.1
9 MEX 10.3 9.1 9.3 8.1 0.5
10 MYS 10.8 6.2 10.2 5.4 7.8
11 NZL 5.2 1.2 6.2 2.4 5.0
12 PER 32.0 26.5 26.2 22.1 2.0
13 PHL 42.9 36.8 34.0 28.4 8.2
14 RUS 60.4 41.6 43.1 33.0 13.9
15 SGP 7.3 0.9 7.9 1.8 12.9
16 THA 26.3 30.4 -31.2 35.0 8.5
17 CTP 5.5 1.7 6.0 2.0 n.a.
18 USA 10.6 5.0 9.3 4.3 8.5
19 VNM 5.7 0.2 5.6 13.5 5.4
20 EU27 n.a. 0.2 n.a. 0.3 n.a.
21 ROW n.a. 0.9 n.a. 1.3 n.a.
APEC Total 12.7 9.3 8.3 7.1 n.a.
World n.a. 4.3 n.a. 3.5 n.a.




  (Note) Authors’ calculation using the GTAP model and Gempack. GTAP database version 7 
pre-release 6, and Gempack. Row denotes exporters, and Columns denotes importers. 
 
The model estimates generally follow as the trade theory would indicate.  Exports of 
the reforming economies significantly increase. The mechanism of this expansion is 
such that the cheaper import prices pass through the domestic production process, 
depressing the factor prices, and lead to lower the export prices to improve the 
competitiveness of their export industries to recover the trade balances
18. Since the 
expansion of the reforming economies results from the improved competitiveness, their 
exports tend to orient toward all over the world.    The impact of their exports to APEC 
                                                 
18  Macroeconomic closure of the general equilibrium model ensures the expansion of their 
exports to achieve recovery of the trade balance, as their trade balance is determined the 
international capital flows. 
  23(intra-regional trade) is greater in terms of percentage change than to the world, because 
of the intensified trade relations among the APEC economies. The comparison between 
the two cases reminds us of the higher elasticities of substitution in the raw material, 
because Case 1 indicates greater impacts. 
 
There is a contrast between the two estimates with a similar and corresponding scenario, 
namely our estimates in Case 2 – APEC and that by Helble, Shepherd and Wilson 
(2007). In the estimates of the former, the expansion in exports of the reforming 
economies generally surpasses that of other APEC economies, while in the latter, the 
tendency reverses. This is a natural result, because the simulation of HSW measures the 
impacts to bilateral trade flows by applying shocks to the importers transparency index 
(ITI) in the reforming economies only. In the simulation, therefore, only the imports of 
reforming economies are affected. This is why the impact on imports of non-reforming 
economies in APEC is nil in Table 2. Accordingly, the simulated exports just reflect the 
increase in imports of the reforming economies in APEC, and the reforming economies 
result in receiving just average impacts in APEC.   
 
Macroeconomic Benefits: Welfare and Real Gross Domestic Product 
 
The merits of adopting a CGE model include the ability to explicitly estimate the 
macroeconomic benefits of reform, such as potential gains to welfare and real gross 
domestic product (GDP). The GTAP model contains Equivalent Variation (EV), an 
income measure of the welfare improvement, as a standard variable for the presentation 
purpose. Real GDP (the variable rgnp  in the percentage change terms) is also an 
indicator often referred to in GTAP simulations, which focuses on the impacts to 
macroeconomic production
19. One of the policy shocks of our simulation, ams that is a 
kind of technical progress, should directly bring about expansionary effects, as well as 
efficiency improvements. The other policy shock, the reduction of irregular payments 
also contributes to the efficiency improvements we find by expanding lower cost 
imports
20. A technical progress, enabling the economy to produce more with fixed 
                                                 
19  This reference indicator corresponds to the weighted sum of the sector base output in the 
economy. 
20  The welfare improvement from the removal of irregular payments should be smaller than that 
  24amounts of production inputs, brings about effects similar to quantitative increases in 
resources, such as labor, land and capital. At the same time, the reduction of trading 
costs may bring about an effect that resembles removal of tax with its resulting 
distortion. Table 4 below summarizes the impacts on EV and real GDP of the economies 
of APEC, as well as non-APEC economies in the world. 
 
Table 4: Estimated Impact on Macroeconomic Indicators 
(Billion US dollar for EV, % change for real GDP) 
GDP EV GDP EV
AUS 0.0 1 0.0 0
CAN 0.0 -1 0.0 -1
CHL 0.0 0 0.0 0
CHN 6.3 110 4.7 80
HKG 0.0 6 0.0 3
IDN 4.4 11 3.1 8
JPN 0.0 2 0.0 2
KOR 1.1 8 0.8 6
MEX 3.1 22 2.7 19
MYS 8.0 13 6.6 12
NZL 0.0 0 0.0 0
PER 3.9 3 2.6 2
PHL 15.0 18 11.5 14
RUS 16.1 118 9.7 75
SGP 0.2 4 0.1 3
THA 22.4 61 18.3 54
CTP 0.0 3 0.0 3
USA 0.0 1 0.0 -2
VNM 31.3 22 24.8 19
EU27 0.0 -4 0.0 -10
ROW 0.0 8 0.0 3
APEC -- 402 -- 297
World -- 406 -- 290
Case 1 Case 2
 
 
(Note) Authors’ calculation using the GTAP model and Gempack. The figures are on the prices 
in 2006. 
 
Four points merit discussion in regard to our results. First, the reforming economies in 
APEC stand to benefit significantly in regard to GDP and welfare gains with the type of 
                                                                                                                                               
from technical progress, if the rate of reduction in trade costs is the same, because the former 
involves the simultaneous reduction in transfer income. 
  25reform we examine here. In particular, Vietnam could expect an increase in real GDP by 
more than 30 percent
21 in Case 1. Russia, Philippines and Thailand’s GDP and welfare 
would rise substantially, as well. The benefits to Malaysia and China would be almost 
one year’s growth. The estimated global benefits here with transparency reform, 
US$406 billion in Case 1 and US$290 billion in Case 2 in the 2006 prices are larger 
than those reported in previous work on trade facilitation. For example, Francois et. al. 
(2003) assessed the welfare gains from trade facilitation to cut 1.5% of importing costs 
under the WTO new round, estimating the gains at about $US 63 billion for the world
22. 
The base year of our estimates, 2006, is nine years after their study, and meanwhile, the 
real GDP in East Asia and Pacific, for example, grew nearly double. Even after the base 
year of the estimates is adjusted, our estimates of the gains with transparency reform are 
significantly larger. This means the initial impacts of our scenario is a great challenge to 
the total wide-ranged profound institutional reform, including the elimination of 
corruption, but the expected gains are huge. The estimated effects may receive the 
values of parameters. Appendix D summarizes the results of the systematic sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
Second, the benefits materialize in these estimations only in the reforming economies. 
Virtually no spillover effects of the welfare gains are seen in other economies. This 
suggests a strong incentive to implement these reform measures to improve 
transparency. However, the potential gains require large-scaled industrial adjustment. 
Technical progress from improvements in the quality of labor force, for example, would 
lead to economic growth without serious industrial adjustment. However, when the 
technical progress takes place in specific industrial sectors, or across-the-board 
importing sectors (as in our case), domestic resources would shift to specific favored 
sectors
23. This is the source of the welfare and real GDP gains. This finding requires 
further investigation of the sector base impacts which follows in the next sub-section. 
 
Third, non-APEC economies do not gain in a significant manner with the specifications 
                                                 
21  As a general tendency, EV in terms of national income amount to similar magnitude to GDP. 
22  The scenario assumes the liberalization of 50% of border measures. Their study is based on 
the 1997 dollar value. 
23  In our case, the production resources are expected to shift from importing sectors to 
exporting and/or non-traded goods sectors. 
  26we adopt here. Non-APEC member economies, as well as non-reforming APEC 
members, are assumed to take no reform action.  The only possible source of gain for 
these economies is efficiency improvements, such as expansion of the industrial sectors 
with comparative advantages. However, the effects appear weak in the simulation. 
 
Fourth, the impacts from the reduction of irregular payments at the border with lower 
levels of corruption and higher transparency are smaller than those from technical 
progress. This reflects: (i) the irregular payments are accompanied with the reduction in 
transfer income to national authorities, offsetting the net impacts; and (ii) the relatively 
smaller contributions to the trade cost reduction from the reduction of irregular 
payments, around 20 to 40 percent in the total shocks. The impacts on the world welfare 
attributable to the reduction in irregular payments are US$73 billion and US$52 billion 
in Case 1 and 2, about 18 percent of the total impacts.   
 
Sector-based Impacts on Domestic Production 
 
As briefly discussed in the previous section, sector-base analysis would be required to 
assess the needs for industrial adjustment. Table 5 below summarizes the percentage 

































AUS 0.6 1.1 -1.9 -0.1 0.2 2.5 -1.8 -0.2
CAN 0.8 0.5 -2.5 0.0 0.7 1.5 -2.8 -0.1
CHL -0.3 -0.1 -5.5 0.2 -0.9 1.2 -6.1 0.0
CHN -5.4 -1.1 0.8 2.6 -0.8 -4.7 0.3 2.1
HKG -2.2 -4.3 -7.1 0.7 -0.1 1.7 -1.6 -0.1
IDN -1.9 -2.2 6.7 1.3 -1.1 -4.0 3.3 1.8
JPN 0.2 1.3 0.6 -0.2 0.3 1.8 0.1 -0.3
KOR -4.1 1.0 0.2 0.0 -1.0 -1.5 0.4 0.2
MEX -1.1 -2.1 3.8 0.2 -0.7 -2.8 3.0 0.7
MYS -4.3 -3.9 5.3 -0.2 -3.6 -4.6 4.2 0.7
NZL 0.0 0.6 -3.8 0.1 -0.2 1.9 -3.8 -0.1
PER 0.7 2.3 -11.9 1.6 2.0 0.8 -11.0 1.8
PHL -16.6 -19.5 54.6 5.4 -10.7 -27.9 46.0 6.9
RUS -0.7 -3.8 -23.5 2.4 -0.2 -14.1 -28.7 4.0
SGP -0.9 0.1 2.2 -0.4 -1.5 3.6 2.5 -1.3
THA -22.6 -21.9 14.7 26.2 -15.2 -26.9 17.0 28.4
CTP -0.7 1.4 -1.6 0.1 -0.6 3.1 -2.3 0.0
USA 0.9 0.7 -0.7 -0.1 0.6 1.2 -0.6 -0.1
VNM -15.6 -28.5 15.7 17.2 -17.4 -38.6 -2.6 22.3
EU27 0.1 0.0 -1.7 0.2 0.4 0.8 -1.3 0.0
ROW 0.3 -0.1 -2.5 0.1 0.2 1.0 -2.3 -0.1
Case 1 Case 2
 
(Note) Authors’ calculation using the GTAP model and Gempack. 
 
Case 1 assumes that improvement of transparency leads to the reduction of importing 
cost in all the industrial sectors, while Case 2 assumes that raw materials do not benefit. 
As expected, the economies with greater potential for improvement in transparency 
would face more serious industrial adjustment, if they implement the reform. In Case 1, 
where the adjustment need is more serious, Russia needs to shrink all the sectors but 
services (SRV). Improved terms of trade and increased imports would likely 
compensate for the shrinkage of trading sectors, but this may be a kind of “Dutch 
Disease” syndrome. The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam face a reduction in raw 
materials and basic manufactures (MNB) and expansion in assembling manufacture 
(MNA) to a greater degree. 
 
Comparing both cases here, case 2 does not involve the need to reduce raw material 
production, as the scenario precludes the reduction of importing costs in the raw 
material sector, equivalent to protecting the sector. This provides one reason why the 
  28macroeconomic benefits in Case 2 are smaller than Case 1. Another reason could be that 





In theory, trade facilitation reform measures tend to create less trade diversion effects. 
Table 6 summarizes the impacts on the direction of nominal trade.  Overall, exports 
from and to APEC members increase. The largest gains are associated with exports from 
APEC members to APEC members, followed by that from non-APEC to APEC 
members, and that from APEC to non-APEC. One may note also that the exports from 
non-APEC economies to non-APEC economies are lowered by about 3 percent or less. 
The trade relations between the APEC members has been strong, and even 
non-discriminatory trade liberalization measures, such as transparency improvements, 
would intensify intra-regional trade ties. However, these somewhat negative impacts on 
the nominal trade between the non-APEC economies are generally much smaller than 
the bilateral preferential trade liberalization, such as regional trade agreements. 
 
Table 6: Impacts on Directions of Nominal Exports (%) 
APEC non-APECWorld
APEC 12.7 3.3 9.3
non-APEC 9.5 -3.4 0.4
world 11.6 -1.4 4.3
APEC non-APECWorld
APEC 10.9 0.4 7.1
non-APEC 7.7 -2.1 0.5















  29Implications from the Simulation Results 
 
Significant Impacts from Transparency Improvement 
 
The significant magnitude of macroeconomic impact estimated here would involve the 
need to undertake substantial industrial adjustment with possible labor dislocation. 
Indeed, our simulation indicates large potential changes in production structures in the 
reforming economies in APEC.  In this sense, the macroeconomic benefits may work 
as both an incentive and disincentive to policy makers in moving forward with reform. 
Notwithstanding, our results suggest that the large-scaled institutional reforms 
associated with transparency could bring about considerable welfare gains and 
expanded trade, even compared to other trade facilitation measures. While the goal to 
improve the importer transparency index to 0.56 may be greatly challenging for some of 
the developing economies in APEC, they could undertake more moderate and staged 
targets initially. 
 
Reforming Transparency for Reforming Economies   
 
As is relatively common with a CGE simulation, economic reform policies tend to 
mainly benefit countries that undertake reform without significant leakage to outside the 
economy. This is the case for the transparency improvement in trade policy examined 
here. In this sense, the transparency reforms resemble domestic regulatory reforms. 
 
Impact on Non-Member Economies 
 
While trade facilitation measures are non-discriminatory and will benefit non-members 
in the world with causing little trade diversion effects, our results suggest that trade 
relations would be further intensified among Asia Pacific economies with the reform 
measures examined here. In general, transparency improvement in Asia Pacific will be a 




  30Relation to Free Trade Agreements and Multilateral Process 
 
In East Asia, regional trade agreements, such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), are 
increasingly dominant trade liberalization tools. The APEC process appears to be 
influenced directly and indirectly by this trend. While an FTA will work as a building 
block to achieve free trade in the world, serious trade diversion and formation of closed 
trade blocks would be the undesirable bi-products. Trade facilitation measures, 
including the improvement in transparency, are inherently suitable for multilateral and 
open-regional initiatives with little trade diversion. In the regional trade liberalization 
initiatives, simultaneously promoting FTAs and trade facilitation may work as very 




Several issues remain for the future research suggested by our results here. Our 
simulation assumes only a basic static specification of perfect competition with constant 
returns to scale. Other specifications, including increasing returns to scale, should be 
tested, particularly in the context of trade in the Asia Pacific region. Assessing the 
policy implications on the combination of FTAs and trade facilitation reform in the Asia 
Pacific region would be another issue of interest. There may be a possibility to offset the 
shortcomings associated with only one mode of reform at a time. Finally, there is room 
for further theoretical consideration and empirical research on the cost of reducing 
mechanisms of transparency improvement, including the magnitude of irregular 
payments, in particular. This is relevant in regard to reducing risks for the exporters that 
could be addressed in CGE modeling. 
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  32Appendix A: Estimate and Characteristics of Importer Transparency Index (ITI) 
 
As in the text, the ITI index in HSW is the first principal factor, combining 11 variables 
linearly; i.e. 3 variables on predictability of customs administration (time spread for 
import, standard deviation of irregular payments, and favoritism), 4 variables of 
predictability and the simplification of trade policy (percentages of bound tariff lines, 
tariff dispersion, hidden barriers, and E-readiness), and 4 variables on simplification of 
customs administration (clearance time of imports, numbers of agencies involved in 
import, numbers of documents required for import, and irregular payments). The 
variables are largely taken from surveys, such as Global Competitiveness Report and 
Doing Business of the World Bank, The table below summarizes the weights of the 
components for the first principle factor, together with their data source. 
 
Table: Weights of the Components 
Indicator Source  Estimated  Weight 
Percentage Tariff Unbound  MAcMAP (2007)  0.054 
Tariff Dispersion  MacMAP (2007)  0.017 
Std. Irregular Payments  Global Competitiveness Report (2005)  0.183 
Import Time Spread  Logistics Percepeption Index (2007)  0.050 
Lack of E-Readiness  UN Governemt E-Readiness (2007)  0.102 
Clearance Time for Import  Doing Business (2007)  0.225 
Number of Import Documents  Doing Business (2007)  0.048 
Number of Agencies  Logistics Perception Index (2007)  0.064 
Favoritism  Global Competitiveness Report (2005)  0.119 
Irregular Payments  Global Competitiveness Report (2005) 0.158 
Hidden Trade Barriers  Global Competitiveness Report (2005)  0.195 
(Source) Helbel, Shepherd and Wilson (2008) 
 
Contribution of the first factor is 66 percent. As all the scoring weights are positive, the 
first factor can be naturally interpreted as the general tendency, commonly involving in 
the components. Larger weights are assigned to clearance time for imports, hidden trade 
barriers, irregular payments, and their standard deviation. Among them, clearance time 
  33for imports and irregular payments rather directly relate to the cost for trade, while 
others are risk factors. 
 
One should note that the factor analysis does not explain the structural mechanism of 
the transparency, but it aims to simply condense the variables into fewer factors with 
maximizing their variance. In addition, the variables used here may contain wider 
information, not limited to transparency. The obtained ITI may possibility reflect not 
only transparency in a narrower sense, but also institutional efficiency, or even 
modernization of trade procedures of the economy. An economy with higher ITI is 
likely to have better institutions in trade. In this sense, the index in the gravity 
regression should be regarded as proxy, representing all the institutional efficiency, 
openness and fairness in trade, while these ideas can be regarded as transparency.
  34Appendix  B:  Table  of  Region and Sector Aggregation 
 
Region Code Economy Sector Code Industry
1 AUS Australia 1 RAW Raw material
2 CAN Canada 2 MNB Basic manufacture
3 CHL Chile 3 MNA Other manufacture
4 CHN China 4 SRV Services












17 CTP Chinese Taipei
18 USA United States of America
19 VNM View Nam
20 EU15 European Union (15 countries)
21 ROW Rest of the World  
  35Appendix C:    Adjusting GTAP Database to Incorporate Irregular Payments 
 
The existing GTAP model and database are not equipped with the irregular transfer 
payments in the trading process, which is to be changed as a shock in the simulation. In 
the text, we have suggested treating such payments as an import tax. The import tariff 
rates in the existing GTAP database reflect the levels of nominal effective tariff in 2001. 
These tariff rates in the original database should be adjusted to incorporate the irregular 
transfer payments, in addition to the nominal tariff rates, as long as information on the 
levels of trade costs from such payments are available. This Appendix discusses the 
methodology and results of the adjustments in some detail. 
 
Methodology 
Malcolm (1998) suggests a procedure for incorporating improved information on taxes 
into existing model database, while maintaining the internal consistency of the database 
and minimizing the impacts of the tax changes on the value flows in the database. This 
procedure can also apply well to our simulation with some minor modification. Based on 
the suggestion by Malcolm, the GTAP model provides a convenient program, named 
ALTERTAX, to adjust the tax rates by using the model itself to create a new database, 
while minimizing the changes in the trade and consumption flows of the original database. 
A simulation is run where tax rates are shocked to their desired value and the updated 
post-simulation database is used for subsequent policy experiments. 
More specifically, Malcolm (1998) suggests using a special closure and a special 
parameter file to ensure that the rate-changing simulation left other cost and sales shares 
as little changed as possible. His closure fixes regional trade balances, whilst his 
parameter settings amount to "Cobb-Douglas everywhere" -- this keeps nominal budget 
shares fixed
24. Accordingly, the Armington elasticities, ESUBM and ESUBT, are set as 
one. The ALTERTAX closure holds DTBALR (the percentage change in the ration of 
trade balance over national income) exogenous for all regions except one (in our case, the 
rest of the world: ROW), and CGDSLACK exogenous for that one region. 
                                                 
24  See Help file for RunGTAP program for actual implementation. 
  36Shocks for Adjustment 
 
The amounts of shock on nominal import tax, tms, to adjust the pre-shock database are 
set at the negative double of the shock to be applied. This modest adjustment may help 
minimizing the estimate bias to the updated GTAP database, which has been recently 
released. This adjustment provides enough allowance to avoid the pos-shock tariff rates 
to be negative. 
  37Appendix D: Sensitivity Analysis of the Simulation 
 
The model simulation relies on the assumption of the values of parameters. While the 
empirical estimates provide the values of the parameters in the model, the lack of data 
often induce modelers to use estimated values in other countries. Sensitivity analysis is 
undertaken to observe the difference of the simulation outcome by changing the values 
of parameters. The magnitude of the difference in the outcome provides modelers with 
confidence of the reliability of the simulation, which may affect judgments on the 
reliability of policy implications to be drawn from the simulation. 
 
The simulation results of the GTAP model, particularly in regard to the impact on 
changes in trade depend on the assumed values of the Armington elasticities. They 
represent the elasticity of substitution between the share of an exporter county in the 
total imports of the importing country and the relative import prices of the country
25. 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted on the values of the Armington elasticities in many 
cases to test the robustness of the simulation results. 
 
The Gempack software, used for the simulation, provides a tool for conducting 
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (SSA). Selecting one or two different sets of parameter 
values and solving the model for each set is a simple form of sensitivity analysis, 
sometimes referred to as ad hoc sensitivity analysis. However, this approach sometimes 
requires unrealistically many runs and reruns of simulations to obtain a result. The SSA 
approach can considerably reduce the required number of the simulations. Table D-1 
below summarizes the results of SSA on our simulation on the impacts to the nominal 
imports, by changing the values of the Armington elasticities: (i) between the imports of 
a country and (ii) between the imports and domestically produced goods. The 
elasticities are changed to 125 percent (i.e. 25 percent increase) and 75 percent (i.e. 25 
percent reduction). The two elasticities are assumed to change together, and the 
                                                 
25  Assuming that the Armington elasticiy of some goods imported by the United States is six, 
Japanese share in the total imports of the United States is 10% for the goods, and the relative 
price of the imported goods from Japan compared to the average import prices of goods is one. 
If the relative price rises by one percent, then the share of the goods imported from Japan in the 
United States will become 9.4%, six percent decline (i.e. 0.01 x 6 x 10%). The same idea also 
applies to the substitution between the domestically produced goods and imported goods. 
  38triangular distribution is applied. 
 
Table D-1: Sensitivity Analysis on Nominal Imports 
by Changing Armington Elasticities (%) 
Base Mean S.D. Base Mean S.D.
1 AUS 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
2 CAN -2.2 -2.2 0.2 -1.9 -1.9 0.2
3 CHL 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
4 CHN 36.9 37.2 6.3 28.5 28.8 8.5
5 HKG 2.5 2.5 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.3
6 IDN 19.1 19.2 3.3 11.7 11.7 3.8
7 JPN 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9
8 KOR 16.9 16.9 2.1 12.9 13.0 2.9
9 MEX 15.0 14.9 2.4 11.7 11.7 3.3
10 MYS 10.3 10.2 1.4 7.9 7.8 2.0
11 NZL 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3
12 PER 27.0 27.2 4.9 15.8 16.0 5.2
13 PHL 78.0 77.2 12.9 61.2 62.4 16.1
14 RUS 97.3 98.2 14.3 58.2 58.3 12.9
15 SGP 0.9 0.9 0.3 1.3 1.3 0.6
16 THA 41.1 41.1 6.0 29.5 29.7 7.2
17 CTP 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4
18 USA -0.4 -0.4 0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.5
19 VNM 37.5 38.3 5.4 23.6 26.1 0.7
20 EU15 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 -0.9 -0.9 0.0
21 ROW -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 0.1
Case 1: World Case 2: World
importers
 
(Note) Base, Mean and S.D. in the columns indicate the simulation in the base case, the average 
(mean) value of the sensitivity analysis simulations, and standard deviation of the sensitivity 
analysis simulations, respectively. 
 
It is found that the standard deviation for the nominal trade change is relatively large. 
This indicates that the simulation results are sensitive to the values of Armington 
elasticities. For example, the estimated large increase in the imports of Russia and 
Philippines in Case 1 are subject to the possibility to be around 30 to 40 percent, wih the 
confidence interval of the three standard deviations (i.e. 89% confident). One should be 
careful to draw the implication from the simulation that the impacts on nominal trade to 
Russia and Philippines more than 70 percent and 80 percent. Rather, the implication is 
that these impacts would be large, perhaps more than 30 percent. 
 
  39The analysis on the welfare improvement in Table D-2 shows that the standard 
deviations of the welfare improvement in terms of EV are generally small, compared to 
the mean values. For example, even the wide confidence interval of 4.5 standard 
deviation (i.e. 95% confident) range covers $260 billion for Case 1 and $170 billion for 
Case 2. The large welfare gains to APEC economies estimated here, therefore, appear to 
be generally sound. 
 
Table D 2: Sensitivity Analysis on Equivalence of Variation 




Base Mean S.D. Base Mean S.D.
A U S 110000
CAN -1 -1 0 -1 -1 0
C H L 000000
CHN 110 110 6 80 80 5
H K G 660330
I D N 1 1 1 10880
J P N 221221
K O R 881661
MEX 22 22 0 19 19 0
MYS 13 13 0 12 12 0
N Z L 000000
P E R 330220
PHL 18 18 1 14 14 1
RUS 118 118 9 75 75 4
S G P 440330
THA 61 63 4 54 55 5
C T P 330330
U S A 113 - 2 - 2
VNM 22 22 0 19 19 0
EU15 -4 -4 4 -10 -10 3
R O W 881331
APEC 402 -- -- 297 -- --
World 406 -- -- 290 -- --
Case 1 Case 2
 
 
(Note) see Table D-1 above. 
 